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I. BACKGROUND: THE MARY DALY1 CONTROVERSY
In 1992, the American Association of University Women published
a study claiming that public, coeducational schools shortchange
2
3
4
girls. Consequently, interest in single-sex schools resurfaced. In
5
1996, United States v. Virginia intensified the debate about single-sex
education.6 The latest controversy surrounds the legality of single-sex
7
classrooms within a private university.
In the fall of 1998, Boston College administrators unsuccessfully
ordered Mary Daly, a seventy-year-old Women’s Studies professor, to
admit men into her classroom after twenty-five years of excluding
them.8 Daly claimed that the school effectively “fir[ed] a tenured
9
10
professor” after a male student threatened to file a lawsuit.
1. See Robin Estrin, Feminist BC Theologian Asks Court for Help, ASSOCIATED PRESS, May 24,
1999, at 1, available in Westlaw, News Library, APWIRES file [hereinafter Estrin, Feminist]
(characterizing Daly as a “self-described radical feminist theologian” who is “considered a
pioneer” in the field of women’s studies).
2. See AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY WOMEN EDUCATIONAL FOUNDATION, HOW
SCHOOLS SHORTCHANGE GIRLS--THE AAUW REPORT (1992) [hereinafter AAUW REPORT]
(interpreting studies that suggest the educational system is not meeting girls’ needs).
3. “Single-sex” is a preferable term since it refers to biological classification, whereas
“single-gender” refers to sexual identification. See ANN OAKLEY, SEX, GENDER, AND SOCIETY 5
(1972). Many sources use the terms interchangeably, but the author has tried to avoid using
“single-gender” when possible.
4. See David & Jacqueline Sadker, Separate--But Still Short-Changed, WASH. POST, Nov. 1,
1995, at A19 (arguing that instead of organizing all-female classrooms as a permanent response
to gender inequalities in educational outcomes, such as disparities in standardized test results,
improving current coeducational classes is the ideal).
5. See 518 U.S. 515, 556-59 (1996) (holding that Virginia failed to show “exceedingly
persuasive justification” for excluding women from Virginia Military Institute and that the
remedial plan offered for women at a separate college did not offer both sexes benefits
comparable in substance to survive an equal protection evaluation).
6. See MYRA SADKER & DAVID SADKER, FAILING AT FAIRNESS: HOW OUR SCHOOLS CHEAT
GIRLS 233 (1994) [hereinafter SADKER & SADKER] (discussing historical inequalities for women
in coeducation and arguing that single-sex schools help girls develop higher self-confidence, a
stronger sense of identity, and intellectual curiosity over a broader range of subjects than their
coeducational counterparts).
7. See Robin Wilson, Judge Denies Bid to Stop Retirement by Boston College Professor, CHRON. OF
HIGHER EDUC., June 4, 1999, at B11 (explaining that neither the Supreme Court, nor
Massachusetts appellate courts have yet to consider the issue of single-sex women’s studies
classes within a private university).
8. See, e.g., Doris Sue Wong, Judge Rejects BC Teacher Who Bars Men, BOSTON GLOBE, May
25, 1999, at B4 (explaining Daly’s decision to take a leave of absence for one semester rather
than allow males into her class). See generally Robin Estrin, Radical Feminist BC Prof Told She Must
Teach Men, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Feb. 25, 1999, at *1, available in Westlaw, News Library, APWIRES
file [hereinafter Estrin, Radical Feminist] (describing the “ironic” fact that when Daly first
arrived at Boston College, the College of Arts and Science did not admit women, so she taught
men only).
9. See Estrin, Feminist, supra note 1, at 1 (quoting Daly’s attorney’s claim that Boston
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The litigation originated when senior Duane Naquin accused the
school of discrimination in violation of Title IX of the Education
Amendments of 197211 after Daly excluded him from her
introductory feminist ethics course.12 After the school asked Daly to
admit Naquin to her spring course, she refused and took a leave of
13
The Center for
absence to avoid teaching the male student.
Individual Rights, a conservative Washington, D.C. public interest law
firm, sent a letter to Boston College on behalf of Naquin threatening
legal action if Daly did not change her policy.14 Daly responded by
arguing Naquin “did not have the prerequisite.”15
Professor Daly has offered one-on-one tutorials to almost two
dozen male students since she started teaching at Boston College in
16
1966. Daly rationalized not allowing male students in her class by
arguing that women are inhibited when men are in the room,

College used “backdoor tactics” to fire a tenured professor, which could have “sweeping
ramifications for academic freedom and for tenured professors nationwide who disagree with
school administrators”); see also Cindy Rodriguez, Feminist Theologian Fights BC Over Retirement
Question, BOSTON GLOBE, May 15, 1999, at B4 (quoting Daly that her firing was “thug
behavior”).
10. See Judge Backs Firing of Prof for Barring Men From Feminist Classes, THE COMMERCIAL
APPEAL, May 26, 1999, at A6 [hereinafter COMMERCIAL APPEAL] (describing Judge Martha
Sosman’s denial of Daly’s pre-trial motion to enjoin Boston College from distributing
registration materials that did not list her courses).
11. See 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1994) (providing that “[N]o person in the United States shall, on
the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance”).
12. See COMMERCIAL APPEAL, supra note 10, at A6 (reporting that Naquin was excluded
from the course because Daly felt that the presence of males interrupts the dynamic of the
class); see also Samantha Miller, No Boys Allowed: Axed for Barring Men from her Classes, Noted
Feminist Mary Daly Battles Back, PEOPLE, June 14, 1999, at 101 (describing how Naquin felt
offended when Daly showed him the door after he entered her class on the first day); Kim
Franke-Folstad, Feminist Professor Has Gone Too Far From Reality, DEN. ROCKY MTN. NEWS, May 30,
1999, at 6A (recounting that when two male students, including Naquin, attempted to enroll in
her Introduction to Feminist Ethics course, Daly ordered them to exit the room with the words,
“You are not welcome here”).
13. See Miller, supra note 12, at 103 (quoting Boston College spokesman Jack Dunn,
“[Professor Daly] wanted to preach to a converted group of followers”); see also Estrin, Radical
Feminist, supra note 8, at 1 (stating that Daly will not open her classes to men because doing so
would “fundamentally alter her teaching philosophy”). Daly began to teach coed classes in the
early 1970s and observed problems. Id. Daly said, “[e]ven if there were only one or two men
with 20 women, the young women would be constantly on an overt or a subliminal level giving
their attention to the men because they’ve been socialized to nurse men.” Id.
14. See Estrin, Radical Feminist, supra note 8, at 1 (observing that the Center for Individual
Rights has handled similar lawsuits, including one which effectively ended affirmative action in
the admissions process at the University of Texas).
15. See Cindy Rodriguez, College Tells Feminist to Accept Males or Quit, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 7,
1999, at 6 (asserting that Daly did not allow Naquin to enroll in her course because she knew he
was associated with a conservative group at Boston College).
16. See Estrin, Radical Feminist, supra note 8, at 2 (describing Daly’s solution to barring
admittance to male students in a coeducational setting).
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17
thereby lessening the impact of her teachings. According to Daly,
18
she did not violate Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972
because the spirit of the law is “to improve the situation of women,”
which is what class does.19
This Comment discusses the rationale underlying single-sex
education and the diversity in its implementation. This Comment
argues that not only are single-sex classrooms within private
undergraduate institutions legally unsound, but also that this
approach fails to address long-term public policy concerns about the
situation of women in education. As the United States grapples with
20
21
education reform, it is far too easy to initiate Band-Aid solutions.
Single-sex education, ranging from single-sex classrooms to single-sex
public schools, should exist as an option, but Title IX and equal
22
protection standards must be satisfied.
The first section of this article discusses the historical perspective
on single-sex education. The second section argues that single-sex
classes within a private university receiving federal funding violate
Title IX and other legal principles. This Comment concludes with
recommendations for ways to incorporate single-sex education into
the landscape of a private, coeducational university.23

17. See Wong, supra note 8, at B4 (explaining Daly’s reason for excluding males from her
feminist seminars and conveying that Daly would rather retire than admit males into her
seminars).
18. See 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1994) (prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sex in any
federally-funded program).
19. But see COMMERCIAL APPEAL, supra note 10, at A6 (implying that whether Daly’s classes
improve the situation of women is arguable).
20. See generally Ben Wildavsky, School Daze, Budget Frays: A Knockdown Battle Over a Pot of
Education Dollars, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Apr. 19, 1999, at 42 (describing the Clinton
Administration’s attempt to close failing schools, improve teacher training and stop automatic
promotion of failing students to increase accountability).
21. See Lisa K. Hsiao, ‘Separate but Equal’ Revisited: The Detroit Male Academies Case, 1992/1993
ANN. SURV. AM. L. 85, 88 (arguing both that “separate but equal” schools raise public policy
concerns because they “create or perpetuate insidious gender roles and stereotypes”).
Furthermore, “the establishment of [African-American male academies in Detroit] would only
postpone recognition that the solution to the current educational crisis lies not in removing
females from the schools, but in allowing equal access to a quality education for males and
females together.” Id. See also Michael John Weber, Note, Immersed in an Educational Crisis:
Alternative Programs for African-American Males, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1099 (1993) (asserting that legal
obstacles stand in the way of establishing African-American all-male schools). See generally
Michael Meyers, Separate is Not Equal, WASH. POST, Sept. 23, 1992, at A19 (stating that single-sex
education is not the panacea for the problems that plague public education).
22. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 535 (1996) (asserting that single-sex schools
offer benefits to “at least some students” and can indisputably “serve the public good”).
23. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUBLIC EDUCATION: ISSUES INVOLVING SINGLEGENDER SCHOOLS AND PROGRAMS, at 9-10 (1996) [hereinafter GAO REPORT] (outlining
successful single-sex programs that overcame constitutional concerns after school
administrators consulted with the Department of Education’s Office of Civil Rights).
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II. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
A. Primary and Secondary Public Education
Public education evolved from primarily all-boys’ education to
24
coeducation before the turn of the twentieth century. Prior to the
1900s, formal education was mostly available only to boys; girls were
25
typically educated in the home. Gradually, the nation’s system of
“common” schools began to admit and include girls and, by the
1850s, almost as many girls as boys attended elementary school.26
During the 1800s, many debated the desirability of coeducation in
27
secondary schools. Opponents to coeducation cited the need to
28
protect the chastity of girls and to protect their health. Supporters
argued that girls deserved formal education as much as boys did.29 In
addition, considerable discussion centered on the appropriate
curriculum, including differences in abilities and learning styles of
boys and girls and whether they should learn the same material.30
Young women and their parents struggled for years to convince
31
By 1890,
administrators to allow them access to schools.
coeducation served as the most common model for public schools.32

24. See id. at 2 (citing DAVID TYACK & ELISABETH HANSOT, LEARNING TOGETHER, A HISTORY
COEDUCATION IN AMERICAN PUBLIC SCHOOLS (1990), which describes the history of girls’
participation in public education in the United States).

OF

25. See GAO REPORT, supra note 23, at 2 (explaining that girls rarely obtained access to
formal education).
26. See GAO REPORT, supra note 23, at 2 (providing a brief history of integration of girls
into public education in the United States during the 1800s).
27. See GAO REPORT, supra note 23, at 9 (explaining that before the 19th century, most
public schools were single-sex).
28. See IRENE HARWARTH ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., WOMEN’S COLLEGES IN THE UNITED
STATES: HISTORY, ISSUES, AND CHALLENGES 5 (1997) (explaining the argument that women
would not be able to “endure the strain of higher learning”). Dr. Edward Clarke, a retired
Harvard Medical School professor, published a treatise in 1873 in which he observed that if
women used their “limited energy” on studying, they would endanger their “female apparatus.”
Id. Dr. Clarke also wrote that young women could not take college classes and still “retain
uninjured health and a future secure from neuralgia, uterine disease, hysteria, and other
derangements of the nervous system.” Id. (citations omitted). See also GAO REPORT, supra note
23, at 2 (describing initial resistance to integrating girls into public schools because of a need to
“protect girls both from danger to their health and from boys”).
29. See MARY PIPHER, REVIVING OPHELIA: SAVING THE SELVES OF ADOLESCENT GIRLS 16-45
(1994) (describing the history of paternalism and the stereotype of young girls as fragile beings
who did not need to be formally educated).
30. See GAO REPORT, supra note 23, at 3 (providing a discussion of both sides of the
debate).
31. See GAO REPORT, supra note 23, at 2 (describing the process of sex integration in
American public schools).
32. See GAO REPORT, supra note 23, at 2 (explaining that once the Civil War ended, most
public schools admitted girls).
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Some public, single-sex schools continued to exist, but they were far
outnumbered, for economic and practical reasons, by coeducational
33
schools.
A minor renaissance has risen in public, single-sex education in
34
The most recent highly publicized example is the
recent years.
Young Women’s Leadership School of East Harlem.35 The founders
of the school established the single-sex environment to help minority
girls from low-income backgrounds “build self-esteem, become more
assertive, and take on new leadership roles.”36 Although a preference
for single-sex education for girls anchors the school’s founding
philosophy, little research has been done on single-sex public
schools.37 Supporters of the school, however, believe that a single-sex
environment would allow girls to feel more comfortable making
mistakes, encourage them to participate more in athletics, and
increase their level of support for one another since they are not
38
competing for male attention.
Opponents of the publicly funded single-sex school argue that it
39
constitutes state-supported sex separation and that single-sex

33. See SADKER & SADKER, supra note 6, at 18 (explaining that coeducation replaced singlesex education once school officials realized the cost differential between the two systems).
34. See Nadine Strossen, A Symposium on Finding a Path to Gender Equality: Legal and Policy
Issues Raised by All-Female Public Education, 14 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. i, v (1997) (asserting that
single-sex schools, classes and programs have sprouted up throughout the country).
35. See id. at iii (describing the American Civil Liberties Union’s stance against the school,
despite the public support it has garnered).
36. See Jacques Steinberg, Just Girls, and That’s Fine With Them, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 1997, at
B1 (describing how girls who remain silent in class have letters sent home to their parents
urging them to speak up in class). A student at the school stated, “[l]ast year, if I would have
brought up a question about masturbation, the boys would have laughed. This year, I brought
it up in class and the girls were like, ‘Thanks, Abby.’” Id. at 25. Another student said that the
school “feels like home. You can be more open.” Id.
37. See Tamar Lewin, Single-Sex Education on the Rise: Pupils More Likely to Thrive, Achieve in
Same-Sex Classrooms, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Oct. 12, 1997, at A18 (conceding that recent
interest remains unsupported by conclusive social science research).
38. See Jacques Steinberg, Central Board Backs All-Girls School, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 1996, at
B3 (noting that New York City School Board Chancellor Rudy Crew supports Young Women’s
Leadership because he believes it will offer significant educational benefits to young women
who might fall through the cracks of regular coed schools); Jennifer Young, A Symposium on
Finding a Path to Gender Equality: Legal and Policy Issues Raised by All-Female Public Education, 14
N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 29, 30 (1997) (explaining that the girls at Young Women’s Leadership
School of East Harlem insisted on creating a school basketball team); see also Kristin S. Caplice,
The Case for Public Single-Sex Education, 18 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 227, 259 (1994) (arguing that
females tend to exhibit more cooperative behavior in the absence of males).
39. See Jason M. Bernheimer, Single-Sex Public Education: Separate but Equal Is Not Equal at the
Young Women’s Leadership School in New York City, 14 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 339, 372-73 (1997)
(claiming that the Young Women’s Leadership School fails to comply with the VMI decision
because segregating girls to increase their math and science abilities is not an exceedingly
persuasive justification).
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40

schooling does not prepare students for a coeducational world.
Furthermore, critics contend that the market does not provide for
this form of schooling because there is no demand for it, and that
single-sex education may not be as beneficial for men as it is for
women.41
B. Women’s Access to Higher Education
Women’s colleges were established in the mid 1800s and still enjoy
42
tremendous success today. Women’s colleges emerged at a time
when men’s access to higher education was expanding, but women’s
43
Prior to the Civil War, Antioch,
access was extremely limited.
Oberlin, and Hinsdale were the only three private colleges that
admitted women.44 The University of Iowa and the University of Utah
45
were the only two public universities that admitted women. The
Civil War, however, caused a decline in male student enrollment,
thereby making some schools more agreeable to admitting women.46
By 1870, eight state universities accepted women.47
Today, women’s colleges claim to offer a positive learning
48
environment, role models of success, and opportunities for
leadership.49 Some studies show increased student satisfaction,
40. See Caplice, supra note 38, at 279 (noting an existing powerful criticism of public singlesex education).
41. But cf. Caplice, supra note 38, at 279, 286 (exploring the contention that all-male
schools are perceived as seeking to exclude women from gaining access to “power and
influence”).
42. See HARWARTH ET AL., supra note 28, at 58 (describing women’s colleges as a small, but
highly visible segment of American higher education institutions).
43. See HARWARTH ET AL., supra note 28, at 1 (remarking that women’s colleges filled a void
for women’s access to higher education).
44. See HARWARTH ET AL., supra note 28, at 1 (commenting that the original goals of
women’s colleges were teacher training and religious and health education).
45. See HARWARTH ET AL., supra note 28, at 1 (noting that most women seeking higher
education attended private girls “academies” before they had access to coeducational
opportunity).
46. See SADKER & SADKER, supra note 6, at 22 (explaining that many schools reluctantly
began to admit girls and women because of low male enrollment, and that male students and
professors openly ridiculed female students); see also HARWARTH ET AL., supra note 28, at 1
(explaining that social changes, including the American Civil War, led to higher acceptance
rates for women into public and private colleges).
47. See HARWARTH ET AL., supra note 28, at 1 (describing the gradual acceptance of women
by a small number of “mainstream” universities).
48. See SADKER & SADKER, supra note 6, at 233 (including personal accounts of graduates
from women’s colleges).
49. See HARWARTH ET AL., supra note 28, at 84-85 (describing a study comparing women’s
leadership opportunities in coeducational and women’s colleges); see also M. Elizabeth Tidball,
Educational Environment and the Development of Talent, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., SINGLE-SEX:
PROPONENTS SPEAK 50, 54 (Debra K. Hollinger & Rebecca Adamson eds., 1997) (explaining
that the presence of a substantial number of women faculty and women in positions of
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higher educational aspirations and attainment, and lofty career
aspirations and occupational outcomes for students of women’s
50
In 1997, twenty-four percent of female members of
colleges.
Congress and thirty-three percent of women board members of
51
Fortune 500 companies graduated from women’s colleges. While
52
some studies indicate positive effects, others show that women’s
colleges have little or no effect compared to coeducational schools on
53
various outcomes.
C. Current Status of Single-Sex Education
Since the 1960s, the number of single-sex institutions, public and
54
private, secondary and post-secondary, have declined steadily. The
once ubiquitous single-sex public K-12 institutions are now virtually
55
nonexistent. In 1993, only one percent of all students in the United
States attended a single-sex, K-12 school.56 Private single-sex schools
exist mainly at the secondary level, and the number of post-secondary
57
single-sex institutions is declining.
leadership within an institution benefit women students not only by their presence, but also by
their concern for “issues that affect women in higher education”).
50. See SADKER & SADKER, supra note 6, at 233 (comparing the outcomes of students who
attended women’s colleges to their coeducational counterparts).
51. See HARWARTH ET AL., supra note 28, at 83 (indicating that women who attend women’s
colleges are more likely to have studied math, science, or economics, more than two times as
likely to receive doctoral degrees, and more likely to attend medical and law school than their
coeducational counterparts); see also Judy Mann, Women’s Colleges: A Study in What Works, WASH.
POST, Aug. 15, 1997, at E3 (providing statistics about women’s college graduates).
52. Id.; see also Cornelius Riordan, The Case for Single-sex Schools, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC.,
SINGLE-SEX SCHOOLING: PROPONENTS SPEAK 43, 44 (Debra K. Hollinger & Rebecca Adamson
eds. 1993) (showing that while “no negative attitudinal results accrue to females attending
single-sex secondary or post-secondary schools . . . [t]he results for males . . . are generally null
or negative”). However, “among African-American and Hispanic males in the United States . . .
findings parallel the results for girls--favoring single-sex schools in both attitudinal and cognitive
outcomes.” Id.
53. See HARWARTH ET AL., supra note 28, at 83 (describing studies that indicate women’s
colleges are not the panacea that some people believe them to be). Furthermore, in at least
some of the studies, flaws in the research methodologies have raised questions regarding their
validity. Id. Methodological problems include “lack of ability to control background
characteristics (such as student motivation, socioeconomic status, and academic ability), small
sample size, and focus on single institutions.” Id.
54. See DEBRA K. HOLLINGER, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., SINGLE-SEX SCHOOLING: PERSPECTIVES
FROM PRACTICE AND RESEARCH i, i-ii (Debra K. Hoolinger, ed. 1993) (intending to find out
what, if any, outcomes result from attending single-sex schools).
55. See id. at i (describing the current status of single-sex public education).
56. HOLLINGER, supra note 54, at i.
57. See HOLLINGER, supra note 54, at i (explaining that the single-sex institutions (mostly
private, post-secondary schools) that have survived over the years “trumpet their virtues,” but
the fact remains that they appear to be an “endangered species”); see also HARWARTH ET AL.,
supra note 28, at 47 (indicating that in 1993, women’s colleges accounted for less than one
percent of the 14.3 million students enrolled in all institutions of higher education). See
generally HARWARTH ET AL., supra note 28, at 11 (noting that presently there are only three

http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol9/iss1/18

8

Ahranjani: Mary Daily v. Boston College: The Impermissibility of Single-Sex
AHRANJANI.FINAL

2001]

3/7/01 9:07 PM

MARY DALY v. BOSTON COLLEGE

187

To understand the current controversy about single-sex classes
within a private university, it is important not only to have a historical
perspective of single-sex education, but also to consider the U.S.
Supreme Court’s role in defining the limits of single-sex education.
III. THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT AND SINGLE-SEX
EDUCATION
Legislation resulting from social changes caused a decline in
enrollment at single-sex schools and the dissolution of many single58
In 1972, Congress enacted nondiscrimination
sex institutions.
legislation to protect students from discrimination in education on
the basis of gender.59 Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972
prohibits school districts from discriminating against students on the
60
basis of sex and sets legal limits to single-sex public education. Since
the passage of Title IX, several Supreme Court cases, including United
61
States v. Virginia (“VMI”) and Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan
62
(“Hogan”), have challenged single-sex public education under the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.63 In fact, the
Supreme Court has only heard three cases in the area of single-sex
education since the passage of Title IX, including Vorcheimer v. School
District of Philadelphia (“Vorcheimer”),64 Hogan,65 and VMI.66 The
67
Vorcheimer Court used a different analytical framework, so most legal
publicly-funded women’s colleges existing in the United States--Mississippi State University for
Women, Douglass College of Rutgers University, and Texas Women’s University).
58. See HARWARTH ET AL., supra note 28, at 21-30 (explaining how World War II and the
ensuing women’s liberation movement led to, inter alia, legislation regarding women in higher
education).
59. See Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1994)
(prohibiting discrimination based on sex in any school program receiving federal funding).
60. Id. § 1681(a)(1).
61. 518 U.S. 515, 539-40 (1996) (holding that Virginia, in failing to show exceedingly
persuasive justification for excluding women from the citizen-soldier program offered at VMI,
violated the equal protection rights of female applicants, and that the remedial plan offered by
Virginia to create separate programs for women at Mary Baldwin college did not afford both
men and women comparable benefits in substance to survive equal protection scrutiny).
62. 458 U.S. 718, 733 (1982) (holding it unconstitutional to deny a male entrance into a
publicly funded, single-sex nursing college).
63. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (“No State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws.”).
64. See 532 F.2d 880, 888 (1976), aff’d per curiam by an equally divided court, 430 U.S. 703
(1977) (ruling all-male high school that denied female applicants admission did not violate the
Equal Protection Clause).
65. See Hogan, 458 U.S. at 733 (O’Connor, J.) (finding that a state-supported university
cannot deny qualified males admittance to its nursing school).
66. See VMI, 518 U.S. at 534 (requiring integration of women into the historically all-male,
publicly funded military school called Virginia Military Institute).
67. See GAO REPORT, supra note 23, at 12 (explaining that the Court in Vorcheimer did not
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68
scholars rely more heavily on VMI and Hogan. The Courts in VMI
and Hogan relied on the intermediate scrutiny standard, which
requires that the gender--based classification serve important
governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means employed
69
be substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.

A. Vorchheimer v. School District of Philadelphia
In Vorchheimer, an all-male public high school in Philadelphia
70
denied admission to a female student solely on the basis of her sex.
At the time of the lawsuit, the Philadelphia School District operated
two single-sex academic high schools, Central High School
71
(“Central”) and Philadelphia School for Girls (“Girls”). The U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit found that Girls and Central
were academically and functionally equivalent, and that the
admission requirements based on gender classification did not violate
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.72 The
court reasoned that sex should not be treated the same as race under
the Equal Protection Clause because, unlike race, fundamental
differences do exist between girls and boys.73 The court also noted
that the primary aim of any school system should be to provide the
highest quality education possible, which, in this case, meant singlesex education.74
On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court decision
75
without comment. However, it did so in a 4-4 split, which means the
76
In 1983, female
decision is binding only in the Third Circuit.
use the intermediate scrutiny test requiring a valid justification for employing a suspect
classification).
68. See GAO REPORT, supra note 23, at 13 n.17 (asserting that Vorcheimer has no
precedential value, except in the Third Circuit).
69. See Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 723-24 (1982) (laying the
framework of scrutiny for classifications based on sex).
70. Vorchheimer v. School Dist. of Phila., 400 F. Supp. 326, 333 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
71. See GAO REPORT, supra note 23, at 12-13 (explaining that both schools maintained
excellent reputations). Enrollment in either school was voluntary. Id. The district also
provided coeducational college preparatory high schools. Id.
72. See Vorchheimer, 532 F.2d at 885-87 (considering whether states can provide “separate
but equal” high schools for males and females).
73. See id. at 886 (asserting that since boys and girls have fundamental differences, unlike
people of different races, gender cannot be treated the same as race).
74. See Vorchheimer, 532 F.2d at 887-88 (explaining that, given the objective of a quality
education and the theory that adolescents may study more effectively in single-sex schools, the
court decided that the policy of the school board here did bear a substantial relationship to
providing high quality education).
75. See Vorchheimer, 430 U.S. at 703.
76. See Vorchheimer v. School Dist. of Phila., 532 F.2d 880, 888 (3d Cir. 1976), aff’d by an
equally divided court, 430 U.S. 703 (1977) (holding that the separate but equal schools did not
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students again sought admission to the all-boys Central High School
and brought suit in the Common Pleas Court of Philadelphia County
alleging that being denied admission to Central violated their rights
77
under the Pennsylvania and U.S. Constitutions. The court found
that Vorchheimer did not bar the claim because representation by
78
The court
plaintiff’s counsel was “materially inadequate.”
proceeded to order the admission of girls to Central on the grounds
that Girls did not provide equal facilities and opportunities to female
students that Central provided to male students.79
B. Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan
Mississippi University for Women (“MUW”), the nation’s first
80
public women’s college, opened its doors in 1884. Joe Hogan, a
registered nurse and qualified applicant, was denied admission to
MUW’s School of Nursing baccalaureate program solely on the basis
of sex.81 He filed suit against the school in 1982.82
By a vote of 5-4, the Supreme Court held that denying men
admission to the nursing school violated the Equal Protection
83
Clause. In its analysis, the Court used a modified intermediate level
of scrutiny: the state needed to show an “exceedingly persuasive
justification” for classifying individuals on the basis of sex.84 That
burden can be met only by showing that the classification serves
“important governmental objectives” and that the discriminatory
violate the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); Mark Walsh, Number of
Single-Sex Programs on the Rise, GAO Says, EDUC. WK., June 12, 1996, at 7 (explaining that the
Supreme Court decision creates no precedent since the vote resulted in a tie).
77. See GAO REPORT, supra note 23, at 13 n.17 (summarizing a subsequent lawsuit against
the Philadelphia School District).
78. See GAO REPORT, supra note 23, at 13 n.17 (indicating that the court could hear this
case even though it was based on the exact same facts and law because plaintiff’s counsel made
a grievous mistake by not providing the court with relevant evidence).
79. See GAO REPORT, supra note 23, at 13 n.17 (analyzing where the Supreme Court erred
in Vorchheimer). In finding the representation inadequate, the trial court noted many facts not
considered by the Supreme Court. Id. For example, the boys’ campus was almost three times
larger, its library had almost twice as many books, the boys’ school had a computer room, and
its graduates received almost twice the amount of college scholarship money. Id.
80. See Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 719-20 (1982) (explaining that
the state legislature created the school).
81. See id. at 721 (citing the lower court’s factual determination that Hogan was a qualified
applicant).
82. See GAO REPORT, supra note 23, at 12 (explaining that MUW has admitted only women
since its inception by a Mississippi statute in 1884).
83. See Hogan, 458 U.S. at 724 n.8 (citing Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 273 (1979) for the
proposition that the policy of denying males the right to obtain a nursing degree at MUW
imposed upon Hogan “a burden he would not bear were he female”).
84. Hogan, 458 U.S. at 724.
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means employed are “substantially related” to achieving those
85
objectives.
Justice O’Connor, who wrote the majority opinion, decided that
the state’s primary argument, that the policy constituted educational
affirmative action for women, was not persuasive since women have
86
If anything, argued
not lacked opportunities to enter nursing.
O’Connor, the statute “tends to perpetuate the stereotyped view of
87
The policy also failed
nursing as an exclusively women’s job.”
because the state did not prove that the gender-based classification
was substantially and directly related to its proposed compensatory
objective.88 MUW now admits men, but it remains committed to
providing “distinctive opportunities for women.”89
The majority in Hogan carefully said that the Court was not
considering whether a state could fund “separate but equal” colleges
90
for men and women. Rather, the Court considered only whether a
man should be admitted to the School of Nursing and not other
schools within MUW.91 The Court did not find that all public singlesex education was unconstitutional, just that Mississippi’s articulated
92
Furthermore, the
objective did not warrant excluding one sex.
Court did not discuss the status of private single-sex education.93

85. Id.
86. See id. at 729 (explaining, furthermore, that historically the field of nursing never
excluded women).
87. See id. at 729 (implying that the school’s women-only admission policy did not serve as
affirmative action for women, but instead served to perpetuate negative stereotypes); see also
Denise C. Morgan, Finding a Constitutionally Permissible Path to Sex Equality: The Young Women’s
Leadership School of East Harlem, 14 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 95, 108 (1998) (describing how such
stereotyping depresses the wages of women in the field).
88. See GAO REPORT, supra note 23, at 12 (explaining that the requisite connection
between the means and the end failed to exist in this case because the classification did not
serve its articulated purpose).
89. See HARWARTH ET AL., supra note 28, at 35 (citing the Board of Trustees of State
Institutions of Higher Learning in Mississippi, which stated, “[t]oday, the university refers to
itself as Mississippi University for Women . . . and smart men, too!”).
90. See Hogan, 458 U.S. at 720 n.1 (conveying that since Mississippi maintains no other
single-sex public university or college, the Court was not “faced with the question of whether
States can provide ‘separate but equal’ undergraduate institutions for males and females”).
91. See id. at 723 n.7 (“[W]e decline to address the question of whether MUW’s admissions
policy, as applied to males seeking admission to schools other than the School of Nursing,
violate[d] the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
92. See id. at 728 (stating that “[i]n limited circumstances, a gender-based classification
favoring one sex can be justified if it intentionally and directly assists members of the sex that is
disproportionately burdened.”).
93. See Respondents’ Brief at 35-36, United States v. Virginia (Nos. 94-1941, 94-2107)
(explaining “[t]he unconstitutionality of the MUW women-only admissions policy invalidated in
Hogan does not affect the continued legality of private single-sex education.”).
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C. United States v. Virginia
Virginia Military Institute, the state’s only public, single-sex
institution of higher education, purports to produce male “citizensoldiers” who are both civilian and military leaders.94 Title IX does
not apply to undergraduate institutions of higher education that have
traditionally and continually had a policy of admitting only students
of one sex.95 VMI is such an institution.96 Using a unique system of
“adversative training” not available elsewhere in Virginia, VMI teaches
97
a strong moral code, physical discipline, and mental challenge.
With the largest per-student endowment of any undergraduate school
in America, VMI obviously instills in its graduates a sense of pride.98
In a suit brought by the Justice Department in 1990, a U.S. District
Court held that VMI’s male-only admissions policy does not violate
99
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. The District
Court reasoned that single-sex education yields substantial benefits
for both men and women and that VMI’s unique method of
instruction enhanced diversity in an otherwise coeducational Virginia
system.100 In 1992, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
disagreed and ordered Virginia to remedy the constitutional
101
violation. In response to this reversal, Virginia proposed to create
the Virginia Women’s Institute for Leadership (VWIL) as a parallel
program for women.102 VMI proposed that it be allowed to continue
to admit only men, and that it would assist nearby Mary Baldwin
College in establishing a “leadership” program for women that would
94. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 520 (1996) (describing the school’s
philosophy and aims).
95. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(1). See Vorchheimer v. School Dist. of Phil., 532 F.2d 880, 883 (3d
Cir. 1976), aff’d 430 U.S. 703 (1977) (finding that Title IX applies only to specified types of
educational institutions and excludes from its coverage the admission policies of secondary
schools).
96. See VMI, 518 U.S. at 540 (stating that VMI had a “historic and constant plan--a plan to
‘affor[d] a unique educational benefit only to males.’” (citation omitted)).
97. See id. at 520 (describing how VMI aims to instill physical and mental discipline in its
cadets and implant in them a strong moral code).
98. See id. (noting that alumni place a high value on their VMI training, as evidenced by
the fact that VMI has the largest per-student endowment of all public undergraduate
institutions in the Nation).
99. See United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. 1407, 1410 (W.D. Va. 1991) (entering
judgment in favor of Virginia).
100. See VMI, 518 U.S. at 524 (restating the District Court’s rationale that if single-sex
education for males constitutes an important governmental objective, it becomes obvious that
the only means of achieving that objective is to exclude women from VMI).
101. See United States v. Virginia, 96 F.3d 114, 117 (4th Cir. 1996) (requiring Virginia to
provide equal educational opportunities to its women as well as its men citizens).
102. VMI, 518 U.S. at 548 (describing the state’s plan to comply with the Circuit Court’s
holding).
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103
The Fourth Circuit ruled
approximate VMI’s program for males.
that despite the difference in prestige between VMI and VWIL, the
two programs would offer “substantively comparable” educational
benefits.104 The United States appealed to the Supreme Court.105
The Court tackled the issue of whether Virginia’s creation of the
VWIL as a comparable program to VMI satisfied the Fourteenth
106
The Court decided that
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.
VWIL did not meet the equal protection requirement because the
program and facilities at Mary Baldwin College were not comparable
to those at VMI.107 Virginia argued that the men-only policy is based
on a philosophy of leadership training that involved physical fitness,
emotional stability, and self-discipline.108 Virginia claimed that it
maintained a valid interest in providing educational opportunities to
students who could benefit from single-sex education and admitting
women would fundamentally alter the school’s curriculum.109
Virginia also argued that VWIL provided a separate-but-equal
educational opportunity for women.110 VWIL did not use VMI’s
adversative method, but instead a cooperative method to build self111
esteem.
The United States countered with the argument that separate is
112
It also argued that VWIL and VMI were not equal in
not equal.
terms of resources, reputation, and the value of its degrees. Finally,
the United States disputed Virginia’s claim that VMI’s adversative

103. See RIORDAN, supra note 51, at 45 (explaining Virginia’s attempt to comply with the
court’s ruling by creating VWIL). Women in this program would live in separate dormitories
from regular Baldwin students, participate in leadership activities, and enroll in the Reserve
Officers’ Training Corps program at Baldwin. Id.
104. See VMI, 44 F.3d 1229, 1240-41 (4th Cir. 1995) (affirming the District Court’s approval
of the remedial plan).
105. 116 S. Ct. 281 (1995).
106. See VMI, 518 U.S. at 530-31 (asking whether the VMIL program is the appropriate
remedy if it is found that VMI has violated the Constitution’s Equal Protection principle).
107. See id. at 566 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (stating that VWIL is “distinctly inferior to
the existing men’s institution and will continue to be for the foreseeable future”).
108. See id. at 522 (describing VMI’s hierarchical “class system” of privileges and
responsibilities, the “rat line,” and the stringently enforced honor code).
109. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 540 (1996) (claiming that “[a]lterations to
accommodate women would necessarily be ‘radical,’ so ‘drastic,’ Virginia asserts, as to
transform, indeed ‘destroy,’ VMI’s program.”).
110. See id. at 546 (proclaiming that VWIL served to provide female cadets the same
education that VMI provided to male cadets).
111. See id. at 548-49 (explaining that VWIL students receive their leadership training in
seminars, externships, and speaker series, which pale in comparison to the physical rigors of
VMI’s adversative leadership training).
112. See id. at 546 (maintaining that the government’s assertion that VMI’s solution, VWIL,
is “pervasively misguided”).
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method must substantially change with the admission of women.
In a 7-1 decision114 the Court held that VMI’s male-only admissions
policy was unconstitutional since no adequate alternative for women
115
Because it failed to show “exceedingly persuasive
existed.
justification” for VMI’s sex-based admissions policy, Virginia violated
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.116 Virginia
failed to support its claim that single-sex education contributes to
educational diversity because it did not show that VMI’s male-only
admissions policy was created or maintained with the purpose of
117
furthering educational diversity.
Furthermore, the Court ruled that VWIL could not offer women
the same benefits as VMI offered men.118 VWIL would not provide
women with the same rigorous military training, faculty, courses,
facilities, financial opportunities, or alumni reputation and
connections that VMI affords its male cadets.119
Finally, the Supreme Court found the Fourth Circuit’s “substantive
120
comparability” standard between VMI and VWIL misplaced.
Holding that the Fourth Circuit’s “substantive comparability”
standard was a displacement of the Court’s more exacting standard,
the Court required that “all gender-based classifications today” be
evaluated with “heightened scrutiny.”121 Under the heightened
scrutiny standard, because Virginia’s plan to create VWIL would not
provide women with the same opportunities as VMI provides its men,
113. See id. at 524 (setting forth the government’s argument that the only accommodations
the school would have to provide to women that they didn’t for men included bathroom and
other living facilities, but that the school’s educational philosophy and teaching methods would
not have to change if they admitted female cadets).
114. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 558 (1996) (reporting that Justice Thomas
took no part in the consideration or decision of the case).
115. See id. at 563 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (“Had Virginia made a genuine effort to
devote comparable public resources to a facility for women, and followed through on such a
plan, it might well have avoided an Equal Protection violation.”).
116. See id. at 534 (finding that Virginia’s remedial plan did not cure the constitutional
violation--i.e., equal opportunity).
117. See id. at 539 (explaining that Virginia failed to show the requisite intent necessary to
justify a suspect classification).
118. See id. at 557 (reporting that VWIL retained a faculty less impressively credentialed
and less well paid than VMI’s faculty and that VWIL provided limited course offerings and fewer
opportunities for military training and for scientific specialization than VMI).
119. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 551 (1996) (describing the myriad of ways
in which VWIL does not qualify as VMI’s equal, including facilities, reputation, alumni base,
etc.).
120. See id. at 555-56 (reversing the Circuit Court’s holding that VMI and VWIL were
similar enough to withstand an equal protection attack).
121. See id. at 555 (stating that heightened scrutiny requires that quasi-suspect
classifications, including sex and illegitimacy, must be substantially related to the achievement
of important governmental objectives).
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Virginia failed to meet the requirements of the Equal Protection
122
VMI cadets and alumni expressed disappointment at the
Clause.
Court’s decision, claiming that “the presence of women will disturb
cadet cohesion.”123
On July 13, 1996, after six years of litigation and six million dollars
in legal expenses, VMI’s governing board narrowly voted 9-8 to
124
The first females
develop a plan for admitting women in 1997.
125
graduated from VMI in May, 1999. An alumni plan to privatize the
school by purchasing it from the state, thereby removing it from the
126
Two days after the Court declared
Court’s jurisdiction, failed.
VMI’s admissions policy unconstitutional, the Citadel127 announced it
was going coed.128 Some people fear that the VMI vote ended the
history of all-male military colleges, as well as all public single-sex
129
In her
institutions of higher education in the United States.
majority opinion, however, Justice Ginsburg wrote:
Sex classifications may be used to compensate women ‘for particular
economic disabilities [they have] suffered,’ to ‘promot[e] equal
employment opportunity,’ to advance full development of the talent and
capacities of our Nation’s people. But such classifications may not be
used, as they once were, to create or perpetuate the legal, social,
130
and economic inferiority of women.

Thus, many argue that public single-sex schools are constitutionally
122. See id. at 555-56 (explaining Virginia’s failure to provide equal opportunities to young
women and men interested in the type of education offered at VMI).
123. See Linda Greenhouse, Court Invalidates VMI’s Exclusion of Women, N.Y. TIMES (www ed.)
(June 27, 1996) at http://world.std.com/~weezer/co/con9603.html (quoting Josiah Bunting,
the head of VMI, as saying, “[t]his is a savage disappointment for the alumni.”).
124. See VMI Reluctantly Agrees to Admit Women, N.Y. TIMES (www ed.) (July 15, 1996) at
http://world.std.com/~weezer/co/con9671.html [hereinafter VMI Reluctantly] (reporting the
reaction of VMI’s governing board to the Supreme Court’s decision).
125. See Josh White, Diplomas, Dreams, and Dissent; First Female Cadets Graduate From VMI,
WASH. POST, May 16, 1999, at C1 (describing VMI’s conferral of degrees to female cadets for
the first time in the school’s history).
126. See VMI Reluctantly, supra note 123, at B3 (stating that the estimated cost of the plan was
over $200 million and it would probably start a new round of litigation); see also HARWARTH ET
AL., supra note 28, at 35 (stating that once VMI’s Board of Visitors was faced with a choice of
becoming a private institution or admitting women, it voted nine to eight to admit women
starting in Fall, 1997).
127. See Mike Allen, Citadel Admits Women After VMI Decision, N.Y. TIMES (www ed.) (June 30,
1996) at http://world.std.com/~weezer/co/con9672.html (noting that the Citadel is South
Carolina’s state-supported all-male military college).
128. See id. (summarizing the Citadel’s reaction to VMI).
129. See Jennifer R. Cowan, Distinguishing Private Women’s Colleges From the VMI Decision, 30
COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 137, 137-38 (1997) (stating that VMI’s supporters, including Justice
Scalia, argue that this decision necessarily extends a destructive arm towards private, single-sex
education in the United States).
130. See VMI, 518 U.S. at 533-34 (providing Justice Ginsburg’s assertion that discrimination
against women is unacceptable).

http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol9/iss1/18

16

Ahranjani: Mary Daily v. Boston College: The Impermissibility of Single-Sex
AHRANJANI.FINAL

2001]

3/7/01 9:07 PM

195

MARY DALY v. BOSTON COLLEGE

permissible under certain circumstances including an expressed
131
intent to provide “affirmative action” to correct past injustices.
Only further litigation will decide the fate of public, single-sex
institutions.132 The Court “implied that the decision should not affect
133
government funding of private colleges,” but the “impact of the
VMI decision on private single-sex education is not yet clear.”134 The
Court has not yet decided on primary or secondary school level
135
single-sex schools.
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Statutory and Constitutional Considerations
Title IX prohibits sex discrimination at educational institutions
136
However, it explicitly exempts private
that receive federal funds.
colleges that do not receive federal funds and public colleges that
historically admitted only one sex.137 Therefore, private colleges not
receiving federal funds can allow single-sex classrooms.
1.

Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972

Title IX protects people from sex-based discrimination in
education programs or activities which receive federal financial
131. See Hogan, 458 U.S. at 728 (explaining the majority opinion’s
affirmative action as a valid defense to a sex classification in certain cases).

recognition of

In limited circumstances, a gender-based classification favoring one sex can be
justified if it intentionally and directly assists members of the sex that is
disproportionately burdened . . . . [W]e consistently have emphasized that ‘the mere
recitation of a benign, compensatory purpose is not an automatic shield which
protects against any inquiry into the actual purposes underlying a statutory scheme.’
Id. (citations omitted).
132. Many people thought the ACLU suit against Young Women’s Leadership School of
East Harlem had the potential to reach the Supreme Court. See Jacques Steinberg, Crew Defends
Establishment of All-Girls School, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 1997, at B3 (asserting that the school will
continue to exist until there is a plaintiff willing to sue the school for violation of Equal
Protection). To date, however, the ACLU has been unable to find a plaintiff. Jacques
Steinberg, All-Girls Public School Opens in New York, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 1996, at B1.
133. See Cowan, supra note 128, at 148.
134. See Cowan, supra note 128, at 148 (asserting that although some claim that a decision
against VMI would force private women’s colleges to admit men or to close down, the
differences between VMI and private colleges as well as equal protection jurisprudence suggests
that no connection exists).
135. See GAO REPORT, supra note 23, at 11 (noting that although single sex public education
could be challenged under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the
Supreme Court has not yet decided such an issue).
136. See 34 C.F.R. § 106.34 (1999) (providing an explanation of when Title IX applies).
137. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1681(a)(5) (West 1998); see also Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555
(1984) (White, J.) (holding that since the college received federal financial assistance, it was
thus subject to the statute prohibiting sex discrimination).
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138
The programs or activities may include, but are not
assistance.
limited to: admissions, recruitment, financial aid, academic
programs, student treatment and services, counseling and guidance,
discipline, grading, classroom assignment, vocational education,
139
recreation, physical education, athletics, housing and employment.
The United States Department of Education maintains an Office
for Civil Rights (“OCR”) to enforce Title IX.140 There are twelve
enforcement offices throughout the country, and the headquarters
are in Washington, D.C.141 Although it has not received many
complaints of violations, OCR has worked with many schools over the
142
For
years to ensure that their programs comply with Title IX.
example, in response to a 1996 complaint against a community
college, OCR issued an opinion letter stating that single-sex selfdefense courses (in this case, all-female) are permissible as long as
“substantial privacy interests compel offering the course in a singlesex environment” and also that the course must be offered to boys.143
As implemented by the Department of Education, Title IX
144
generally prohibits single-sex classrooms in coeducational schools.
The regulation, however, contains some exceptions, including singlesex classes for portions of physical education classes when students
145
146
play contact sports, classes on human sexuality, and chorus
classes.147

138. 34 C.F.R. § 106.1 (2000).
139. Id. § 106.4(c)–(e).
140. See GAO REPORT, supra note 23, at 7 (describing the process of Title IX enforcement).
141. See Title IX and Sex Discrimination, (visited July 15, 1999) at
http://www.ed.gov/offices/OCR/tix_dis.html (noting that Title IX covers state and local
agencies that receive funds, which include 16,000 local school districts and 3,200 colleges and
universities).
142. See GAO REPORT, supra note 23, at 7 (providing that in each instance of a request for
guidance or complaint on either single-sex schools or classrooms, the school district and OCR
have resolved the matter without litigation).
143. See United States Department of Education, Office for Civil Rights, Op. Reg’l Dir.,
Boston, MA (Apr. 23, 1998) (highlighting the fact-sensitive nature of the permissibility of singlesex courses).
144. GAO REPORT, supra note 23, at 7; 34 C.F.R. § 106.34 (stating that a “recipient shall not
provide any course or otherwise carry out any of its education program or activity separately on
the basis of sex”).
145. See 34 C.F.R. § 106.34(c) (1999) (listing wrestling, boxing, rugby, ice hockey, football,
and basketball as “sports the purpose or major activity of which involves bodily contact”).
146. See id. § 106.34(e) (providing that portions of classes in elementary and secondary
schools that “deal exclusively with human sexuality may be conducted in separate sessions for
boys and girls”).
147. See id. § 106.34(f) (1999) (providing that recipients may create “requirements based on
vocal range or quality which may result in a chorus or choruses of one or predominantly one
sex”).
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If the Assistant Secretary for Civil Rights finds discrimination on
the basis of sex, she may require a recipient to take remedial action
necessary to overcome the effects of the discrimination.148 A recipient
may also take affirmative action to overcome the effects of conditions
that have limited participation because of sex in the absence of a
finding of discrimination by the Assistant Secretary.149
The
classifications, however, that result in single-sex classes must be
directly related to the reasons for the implementation of the singlesex classes.150 Three conditions must be met: (1) beneficiaries of the
single-sex classes must have had limited opportunities to participate
in a school’s programs or activities due to their sex; (2) less restrictive
or segregative alternatives that may have accomplished the goals of
the single-sex classes must have been considered and rejected; and
(3) there must be evidence that comparable sex-neutral means could
not have been reasonably expected to produce the results sought
through the single-sex classrooms.151
Professor Daly argued that her classes served as affirmative action
152
She
for women who were once excluded from higher education.
insisted that female students learn better “without male
153
distractions.” This rationale, unfortunately, does not comport with
the narrow room afforded by Title IX to single-sex classes for
affirmative action purposes. The class of students who benefited
from Daly’s classes did not include the same students who were
discriminated against in past years.154 In fact, women now comprise
155
the majority of college students and enjoy nearly equal educational
and professional opportunities as men.156 Since her female students
148. 34 C.F.R. § 106.3(a) (2000).
149. See id. § 106.3(b) (2000) (authorizing institutions to take action to overcome the effects
of conditions that resulted in limited participation by persons of a particular sex).
150. See GAO REPORT, supra note 23, at 22 (explaining that, in the absence of a finding of
discrimination by the Assistant Secretary for Civil Rights, a “recipient may take affirmative
action to overcome the effects of conditions that have limited participation by gender” if the
classifications made are directly related to the reasons for the existence of the single—sex
classes).
151. GAO REPORT, supra note 23, at 22-23.
152. See Miller, supra note 12, at 101 (quoting Daly, “[t]he point of my class is that there
[can] be a space where women can create our own thoughts and our own philosophy,
unencumbered by patriarchal invasions . . . . [i]t’s not about discrimination at all.”).
153. Miller, supra note 12, at 101.
154. See Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 728 (1982) (establishing that a
State can “evoke a compensatory purpose to justify an otherwise discriminatory classification
only if members of the gender benefited by the classification actually suffer a disadvantage
related to the classification”).
155. See HARWARTH, supra note 28, at 27 (conveying that women comprised almost fifty-five
percent of all students in higher education by 1991).
156. See Anita K. Blair, The Equal Protection Clause and Single-Sex Public Education: United
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were not part of the class injured by past discrimination against
157
women in higher education, and since Daly provided no evidence
that comparable sex-neutral means could not produce the results
sought through the single-sex classrooms,158 Daly’s all-female classes
appear to be statutorily impermissible.
2.

The Funding Issue

When Title IX was amended in 1972 to prohibit sex discrimination
at educational institutions that receive federal funds, the only schools
exempted from the regulation were private colleges and public
colleges that historically admitted only one sex.159 Although private,
Boston College receives federal funds; thus, a claim that the school is
160
exempt from Title IX on these grounds fails.
Because almost all schools, including private universities, receive
federal funds, Title IX applies to almost every educational institution,
161
The
contrary to what the statutory list of exceptions implies.
Supreme Court considered the issue of federal funding and private
162
There has been some debate
schools in Grove City College v. Bell.
about whether private schools must comply with Title IX since,
163
However, the Court
theoretically, they are not federally funded.
ended the debate by holding that Title IX binds the private college
even though the school did not directly receive any federal financial
States v. Virginia and Virginia Military Institute, 6 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 999, 1011 (1996) (“As
of 1994, women were 22.3% of physicians, up from 15.8% in 1983, and 24.8% of lawyers and
judges, up from 15.8% in 1983. In 1992, 35.7% of M.D. degrees and 42.7% of J.D. degrees were
conferred on women. Between 1971 and 1992, the percentage of bachelor’s degrees conferred
on women rose from 43.4% to 54.2%, from 40.1% to 54.1% for master’s degrees, and from
14.3% to 37.1% for doctorate degrees.”).
157. See SADKER & SADKER, supra note 6, at 1-35 (articulating the numerous barriers women
have faced in higher education). Past discrimination includes barred admittance into
institutions of higher education, “glass ceilings,” and career tracking into the fields of teaching,
nursing, and secretarial assistance. Id.
158. See Wilson, supra note 7, at B11 (including Judge Sosman’s opinion that Daly has failed
to provide empirical evidence for her claims).
159. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1681(a)(1) & (5) (West 1997).
160. 34 C.F.R. § 106.4 (2000) (requiring that a school that receives federal funds comply
with Title IX).
161. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1681 (West 1998). See Title IX: A Sea Change in Gender Equity in Education
(visited July 15, 1999) at http://www.ed.gov/pubs/TitleIX/part3.html (reporting that OCR
extends protection to 51.7 million elementary and secondary school students, 14.4 million
college and university students, almost 15,000 school districts, more than 3,600 colleges and
universities, more than 5,000 proprietary schools, and thousands of libraries, museums,
vocational rehabilitation agencies and correctional facilities).
162. See 465 U.S. 555, 575-76 (1984) (holding that direct tuition grants to students are a
form of federal financial assistance to the school and requiring that all school departments
comply with the requirements of Title IX).
163. See Cowan, supra note 128, at 164-71 (articulating both sides of the debate).
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164
Some of its students received basic educational
assistance.
opportunity grants under the U.S. Department of Education’s
alternate disbursement system, and used those grants to pay for their
education.165 Since Grove City College received federal funds, it had
166
to comply with Title IX regulations.
Since Boston College receives federal funds both directly and
indirectly through student loans and grants,167 it must comply with
Title IX. Therefore, single-sex classrooms are only permissible in the
above listed circumstances.168 If a private coeducational institution of
higher education receives no federal or state financial assistance
other than aid to students, conditions imposed by Title IX would not
apply since both the institution and students would be free to avoid
conditions by ending their participation in federal student aid
programs.169 Thus, the trigger mechanism for whether a school must
comply with Title IX is whether it receives any direct or indirect
170
federal funding.

3.

The Fourteenth Amendment and Equal Protection

Single-sex education may also be challenged under the Fourteenth
171
The Supreme Court has
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.
not yet considered the constitutionality of single-sex classrooms
within a private university.172 The Court, however, has concluded that
justification for classification based on sex under the Equal

164. See Grove City College, 465 U.S. at 565 (“The economic effect of direct and indirect
assistance [in the form of student loans] often is indistinguishable[.]”).
165. See id. at 559 (describing “Grove City College [as] a private, coeducational, liberal arts
college that sought to preserve its institutional autonomy by consistently refusing state and
federal financial assistance”).
166. See id. at 574 (providing that “[s]ince Grove City operates an ‘education program or
activity receiving Federal financial assistance,’” the U.S. Department of Education may properly
demand that the college execute an Assurance of Compliance with Title IX).
167. Telephone Interview with staff member of financial aid office at Boston College, in
Boston, Mass. (July 16, 1999).
168. See 34 C.F.R. § 106.34(a), (c), (d), and (e) (1999) (considering single sex classes
permissible only when they involve contact sports, human sexuality, or chorus); see also
Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 728 (1982) (permitting single-sex classes
as affirmative action to undo past discrimination only in certain narrow circumstances).
169. See Grove City College, 465 U.S. at 555 (implying that the key factor in determining
whether a school is required to comply with Title IX is whether the school directly or indirectly
receives federal funds).
170. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1681(a) (West 1998).
171. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (declaring that a state may not deny anyone under its
jurisdiction equal protection of the laws).
172. See Wilson, supra note 7, at B11 (explaining that, despite five reprimands from the
college over a twenty year span, since no student has actually filed suit against Professor Daly,
Daly has never admitted a male into one of her classes).
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Protection Clause must be genuine, “not hypothesized or invented
173
Furthermore, the justification
post hoc in response to litigation.”
cannot rely on “overbroad generalizations about the different talents,
capacities, or preferences of males and females.”174
In addition to the federal Equal Protection Clause, some state
constitutions have similar equal protection provisions or equal rights
amendments that have been interpreted by their courts as more
175
rigorous or restrictive than the federal Equal Protection Clause. In
VMI, the Supreme Court decided that under the equal protection
analysis, state actors “controlling gates to opportunity may not
exclude qualified individuals based on ‘fixed notions concerning
roles and abilities of males and females.’”176 Barring admission of
men from Women’s Studies courses implies that only women can and
should benefit from learning about the history of women and
discrimination against them.177 Although Daly offers one-on-one
tutorials for men, this procedure is as questionable as saying VWIL
178
offered opportunities equal to those available at VMI.
B. Considering the Context: Women’s Studies Courses
Should be Coeducational
There is little evidence that single-sex classrooms are necessarily
179
A teacher’s duties include
better than coeducational classrooms.
making sure her or his classroom runs smoothly and effectively. In
response to the argument that a male presence in a classroom
173. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996).
174. Id. at 533. See Cindy Rodriguez, College Tells Feminist to Accept Males or Quit, CHI. TRIB.,
Mar. 7, 1999, at 6 (describing Daly’s failure to cite anything but her own personal observations
as evidence that her justification for single-sex classes satisfied this requirement).
175. See GAO REPORT, supra note 23, at 15 (asserting that even if a single-sex education
program is acceptable under federal law, it may still be challenged under state laws).
176. See VMI, 518 U.S. at 542 (citing J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 139 (1994)) (stating
that equal protection principles, as applied to sex classifications, indicate that “state actors may
not rely on ‘overbroad’ generalizations to make ‘judgements about people that are likely to . . .
perpetuate historical patterns of discrimination’”).
177. See Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 729 (1982) (O’Connor, J.)
(asserting that rather than compensating for discriminatory barriers faced by women, MUW’s
policy “tends to ‘perpetuate the stereotyped view of nursing as an exclusively woman’s job’”).
178. See VMI, 518 U.S. at 548 (“VWIL affords women no opportunity to experience the
rigorous military training for which VMI is famed.
Instead, the VWIL program
‘deemphasize[s]’ military education and uses a ‘cooperative method’ of education ‘which
reinforces self-esteem[.]’”).
179. See AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY WOMEN EDUCATIONAL FOUNDATION,
SEPARATED BY SEX: A CRITICAL LOOK AT SINGLE-SEX EDUCATION FOR GIRLS, at 9 (1998)
[hereinafter AAUW, SEPARATED] (citing experts’ findings that merely creating single-sex
classes, without additional teacher training and other support, is “probably not . . . enough to
create meaningful change”).
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180
inhibits women’s participation, it is the teacher’s responsibility to
teach in a sexually neutral manner and to encourage students to
respect one another’s opinions. Creating single-sex classrooms to
“shield” women from men seems only to further the archaic
stereotype that women need to be protected and cared for against
rational masculine dominance.181
Supporters of coeducation claim that boys and girls learning
together is the most “realistic” system where students prepare for
182
participation in a democratic, mixed-sex society. Men need to learn
183
about the history of sexism as much as, if not more than, women.
Just as Germans whose relatives participated in Hitler’s Nazi regime
need to learn about the racism of World War II, so do men need to
learn about past and current sex discrimination, especially if they
plan to participate in a multi-gendered workforce.184
Applying Justice O’Connor’s reasoning from Hogan, keeping men
out of feminism classes perpetuates the stereotype that only women
185
need to learn about women’s history.

V. RECOMMENDATIONS
Although Daly feels certain her students perform better in single186
187
sex classes, the research findings are mixed. According to sixteen
researchers at a recent roundtable assembled by the American
Association of University Women, there is no evidence that single-sex
education, in general, “works” or is “better” than coeducation.188 To
180. See Estrin, Radical Feminist, supra note 8, at *2 (providing Professor Daly’s rationale for
single-sex classes).
181. See HARWARTH ET AL., supra note 28, at 5 (conveying Dr. Clarke’s professional belief
that women enrolled in college courses are at a greater risk for a variety of physical ailments).
182. See SADKER & SADKER, supra note 6, at 248 (critiquing the anti-single-sex education
argument that single-sex education provides an unrealistic educational experience for
children).
183. See Miller, supra note 12, at 103 (articulating Boston College spokesman Jack Dunn’s
claim that Daly’s no-male policy stifled campus debate and his assertion that “[Daly] wanted to
preach to a converted group of followers, and that’s dangerous.”).
184. See SADKER & SADKER, supra note 6, at 248 (describing the opinion that coeducational
schools serve as a training ground for real life because real life also includes both men and
women).
185. See Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. at 729 (arguing that excluding men
from the nursing profession creates a self-fulfilling prophesy for men who do not enter the
profession because society and our education system deem nursing a “woman’s job”).
186. See Estrin, Radical Feminist, supra note 8 (describing how Daly stopped admitting males
into her classes in the early 1970s when she observed a negative effect on women).
187. See AAUW, SEPARATED, supra note 179, at 2 (citing studies which show both positive
and negative effects associated with single-sex education).
188. See id. (concluding that “the ‘success’ or ‘failure’ of any K-12 single-sex education
initiative is relative to a particular group of students in a particular setting and a given set of
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be sure, some researchers have found that single-sex classes can be
beneficial for young women because the students perceive the
classroom as a safer environment where they feel more free to
189
express themselves. According to the AAUW, some studies suggest
that single-sex classes provide an opportunity for young women to
consider issues of sex identity and varieties of roles women can now
consider in society.190
Many experts argue that the positive findings for single-sex settings
are at least partly attributable to aspects of the settings other than the
sex of the students, including a small student body, a strong emphasis
on academics, and a commitment to the school’s mission and
191
values.
Students who matriculate at a coeducational, private school expect
to enroll in whatever class they desire without being discriminated
192
The coeducational university
against because of their sex.
experience can serve as a training ground for the realities of a multigendered world.193 School officials have a proactive responsibility to
194
ensure equal opportunities before a student has to file a lawsuit.
Assume, however, that Daly continues to believe single-sex classes
are the only way to go. It is possible, in fact, to conduct single-sex
195
For example,
classes and still comply with Title IX requirements.
Boston College may implement a program similar to the one
Connecticut implemented after seeking OCR’s advice.
The
academic or social objectives”); see also id. at 8 (explaining that a meta-analysis of studies on
single-sex classes show mixed results).
189. See id. at 8 (describing that one University of Arizona researcher said “that for middleschool girls she has studied, the experience of the ‘safe environment’ of single-sex classes has
been critical” to the development of self-identity).
190. See id. at 82 (explaining that “[e]vidence from both the literature and our research in
the African-centered schools suggests that girls in single-sex classrooms can be encouraged to
explore a variety of roles and options.”).
191. See HOLLINGER, supra note 54, at 54 (referring to statistical studies that analyze the
factors contributing to a school’s effectiveness); see also AAUW, SEPARATED, supra note 179, at 5
(suggesting that positive outcomes of single-sex environments can be attributed to the students
and not the environments, stating that by choosing a single-sex environment students make a
“pro-academic choice”).
192. E-mail Correspondence with Paula Caplan, Ph.D., Author and Visiting Professor of
Psychology at Brown University (July 12, 1999).
193. See United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. 1407, 1441 (1991) (declaring that experts
agreed that if VMI admitted women, “the VMI ROTC experience would become a better
training program from the perspective of the armed forces, because it would provide training in
dealing with a mixed-gender army”).
194. See Wilson, supra note 7, at A16 (providing Daly’s lawyer’s opinion, which stated that if
Boston College did not agree with Daly’s practices, it should have subjected her to formal
disciplinary proceedings).
195. See Caplice, supra note 38, at 231 (arguing that single-sex schools are “not per se
unconstitutional” because the Supreme Court has left room for educational diversity).
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Connecticut Department of Education wanted to implement a new
introductory technology course to be offered in two formats: an all196
After consulting with OCR,
girl class and a coeducational class.
Connecticut revised its plan such that it had a regular coeducational
197
class and a class targeted at female students but accessible to all.
Since technically all students could enroll in either class, OCR found
that the revision did not raise concerns about discrimination under
198
Title IX.
VI. CONCLUSION
While some social science research certainly supports Daly’s
199
assumption of underlying sexism in coed classrooms, women must
learn how to cope with and overcome such obstacles. Single-sex
education is not a long-term or a panacea solution to cure the
problem of sexism in coed institutions.200 Separating men and
women in classrooms does not necessarily correspond to greater
201
academic achievement.
Daly claimed her classes did not violate Title IX because the law
was designed to improve the situation of women; she feels her classes
202
Her classes did violate Title IX, however,
aim to do just that.
because Boston College, although private, is not exempt from federal
196. See GAO REPORT, supra note 23, at 9-10 (indicating that Connecticut later “revised the
format so that it had a ‘regular class and a second class targeted for female students but
accessible to all students regardless of sex.’”); see also Cowan, supra note 128, at 182 (describing
how some women’s colleges allow male students to register for some classes without recognizing
males as matriculated students as a way to avoid discrimination claims).
197. See GAO REPORT, supra note 23, at 9-10 (providing a description of Connecticut’s
revised single-sex plan, which incorporated OCR’s legal advice).
198. See GAO REPORT, supra note 23, at 7 (explaining that OCR generally wishes to work out
solutions with school officials rather than to litigate violations).
199. See SADKER & SADKER, supra note 6, at 11-14 (asserting that bias against girls and women
persists from the elementary grades through graduate school). See generally Eileen McNamara,
Educator Steers Her Own Course, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 28, 1999, at B1 (stating that only twentynine percent of tenured faculty members at Boston College are women).
200. See Caplice, supra note 38, at 281 (stating that one of the compelling criticisms of
single-sex education concerns the fear that it does not prepare students to compete in the
coeducational world after school). But see William Henry Hurd, Gone with the Wind? VMI’s Loss
and the Future of Single-Sex Public Education, 4 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 27, 37 (arguing that
single-sex schools produce more successful students).
201. See Young, supra note 38, at 30-31 (stating that, just as bad coeducational schools exist,
so do bad single-sex schools exist, so that the sex of the students in a school cannot be the only
factor determining success or failure).
202. See Feminist, supra note 1 (describing Daly’s response to school officials who claim that
her “separate but equal” courses violate federal anti-discrimination laws, that her classes serve as
affirmative action for past discrimination against female students in higher education); see also
Margo Harakas, A Conversation with Mary Daly, SUN-SENTINEL, Apr. 15, 2000, at 1D (providing
Professor Daly’s assertion that “the discussion moves faster if the women have a space of their
own”).
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regulations and because single-sex classes within a private university
203
simply do not fall within the narrow exceptions to Title IX. Daly’s
affirmative action rationale fails because the women allegedly
benefiting from her single-sex classes are not the same ones who were
harmed from the initial discrimination in higher education.204 Since
her classes perpetuate the social stigma that women are fragile, Daly’s
affirmative action claim has no merit.205 A jury trial was originally
scheduled for late summer or early fall, 2000, to determine whether
206
On
Boston College violated Professor Daly’s due process rights.
Monday, February 5, 2001, the day before the case was to be heard,
Daly and her attorney approached Boston College regarding a
settlement.207 The agreement they reached stipulated that the parties
would release a joint statement announcing that the case had been
208
Because of the settlement,
settled and that Daly had retired.
interested observers will remain in suspense on the issue of the
permissibility of single-sex classes within private universities.
In the end, Professor Daly merely pursued her beliefs and took
advantage of the freedom afforded her by Boston College; the school

203. See Miller, supra note 12, at 103 (quoting Daly, “There is a great need for women’s
space.”); Wilson, supra note 7, at A16 (providing the Middlesex Superior Court’s response to
Daly’s preliminary injunction attempting to stop the college from suspending her courses and
from treating her as retired by excluding her name from the 1999-2000 course materials).
Judge Martha B. Sosman said, “there is no question that the school has adequate cause to
terminate Daly’ because of her violation of anti-discrimination laws.” Id.
204. See Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 728 (1982) (O’Connor, J.) (“It
is readily apparent that a State can evoke a compensatory purpose to justify an otherwise
discriminatory classification only if members of the gender benefited by the classification
actually suffer a disadvantage related to the classification.”).
205. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533-34 (1996) (O’Connor, J.)
Sex classifications may be used to compensate women ‘for particular economic
disabilities [they have] suffered,’ to ‘promot[e] equal employment opportunity,’
[and] to advance full development of the talent and capacities of our Nation’s people.
But such classifications may not be used, as they once were to create or perpetuate the
legal, social, and economic inferiority of women.
Id.
206. See Margo Harakas, Radical Differences Boston College Says the Tenured Professor Broke School
Policy by Banning Male Students From Her Feminist Ethics Class, SUN-SENTINEL, Apr. 15, 2000, at 1D
(explaining that Professor Daly’s suit against Boston College alleges breach of contract,
violation of tenure rights, and denial of academic freedom).
207. See Ana Marie Cox, Feminist Theologian Who Barred Men From Her Classes Settles
Suit Against Boston College, Chron. of Higher Educ., Feb. 7, 2001, at 4 (describing the
settlement agreement); see also Ana Marie Cox, Feminist Theologian’s Lawyer May Have Nullified
Her Settlement With Boston College, Chron. of Higher Educ., Feb. 9, 2001, at 3 (articulating Daly’s
response to the agreement).
208. See id. (asserting that Daly’s attorney violated the terms of the agreement reached by
the parties by issuing a press release calling the settlement a “victory” for Mary Daly).
According to Gretchen Van Ness, Daly’s attorney, the press statement resulted from a
“misunderstanding.” Id.
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basically allowed her to break the law for over twenty-five years.
When well-known institutions of higher learning fail to enforce hardfought federal anti-discrimination statutes, one wonders if there is
any point in lobbying Congress to pass such legislation.
Unfortunately Professor Daly’s recently-settled case only concerned
the issue of whether a tenure agreement existed between her and the
school, although her refusal to stop teaching single-sex classes
certainly would have come out in litigation.210 Once again, although
schools maintain a legal and ethical responsibility to uphold state and
federal laws, apparently it requires litigation to force them to do so.211

209. See Radical Feminist, supra note 8 (observing that Daly believes that the school failed to
enforce Title IX requirements in this instance for over twenty-five years).
210. See Feminist Theologian at Boston College Challenges Retirement, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., May
28, 1999, at A8 (explaining the school’s assertion that Daly entered into an agreement to retire,
with which Daly disagrees).
211. See Wilson, supra note 7 (asserting that even though administrators complained to Daly
several times over the years, they never actually forced her to allow men into her class because
there was never a lawsuit against her).
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